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The Right to Privacy
of Medical Records
Balancing Competing Expectations
by Joel Glover, Esq. & Erin Toll, Esq.
Introduction
Today, the right to privacy of medical iecords is seldom
contested. A recent decision by the United States Supreme
Court recognized our "reasonable expectation" that medical
records are private. Courts permit tort claims fo- invasion
of privacy where medical record information is disclosed. Tn
addition, new federal regulations promulgated under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("I IPAA") are being implemented on the presumption that
medical records are private and entitled to protection-
This article examines the development of that right to
privacy and the related balancing of expectations in the
federal courts and the Colorado courts. Even where privacy
rights have been recognized, those rights often fail in the
balancing test when compared to society's legitimate
interest in monitoring health care information. Finally, this
article addresses the information that the HIPAA regulations
consider to be private and subject to protection.
3
The law recognizes our two competing expectations
regarding medical records7 privacy. First, we each expect
our medical records to be private and confidential. Second,
wc understand that privacy will be regularly invaded as a
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part of the health care system to support national
priorities such as the protection of public health, health
care research, health care quality monitoring, and the
prevention of crime, including health care fraud.
These competing expectations are reflected in the
balancing tests established in the federal and state cases
and more recently, in the IIIPAA regulations. First,
medical records are private, consistent with our
expectations. Second, our privacy expectation will be
invaded as necessary to satisfy society's needs to utilize
health care information of the population to promote the
public welfare. While HIPAA, at least in part, appears to
be based on an attempt to codify case law, even after the
HIPAA regulations, a precise understanding of that
balancing test can be elusive. As is evident from the case
law, it often comes down to a case-by-case approach with
the balance typically favoring a limited invasion of our
privacy expectations when societal interests outweigh
our privacy needs.
I. Development of the right to privacy in
medical records.
A. 7he Whalen 4 decision - an arguable right toprivacvy
Over the last thirty years, the federal courts have
uniformly accepted the principal that medical records are
private and entitled to protection. The existence of a right
to privacy in medical records can be traced to the United
States Supreme Court's
decision in Whalen v. Roe.5
In some ways, the Whalen
decision is an unusual
authority to serve as the basis
for such an important privacy
right. In answering the
question before it, the Court
ruled that there was no
constitutional violation and
expressly did not decide
whether there was a right to
privacy in medical records.
6
Nevertheless, it is repeatedly
cited as precedent for that
right.
The Whalen Court was
presented with the question
"whether the State of New
York may record, in a
centralized computer file, the
names and addresses of all
persons who have obtained,
pursuant to a doctor's
prescription, certain drugs
for which there is both a lawful
and an unlawful market.'7 The Court, in an opinion
drafted by Justice Stevens, answered the question
affirmatively and held that, "neitier the immediate nor
the threatened impact of the patient-identification
requirements in the New York State Controlled
Substances Act of 1972 on either the reputation or the
independence of patients for whom Schedule II drgs arc
medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an invasion
of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."' However, in rejecting a constitutional
violation, the Court created the framework by which
future courts would develop the right to privacy in
medical records.
In deciding that there was no privacy violation, the
Court discussed two different types of individual privacy
interests: (1) the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters; and (2) the interest in independence in
making certain important kinds of decisions. 9 The
program did not pose a sufficiently grievous threat to
either interest.( The Court concluded that any privacy
invasions would not be meaningfully distinguishable
"from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that
are associated with many facets of health care."I
Nevertheless, disclosures of private medical
information to doctors, to hospital personnel,
to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modern
medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the
patient. Requiring such disclosures to
representatives of the State having
responsibility for the health of the community,
does not automatically amount to an
impermissible invasion of privacy. 2
In essence, the Court balanced the two individual
interests against the societal need to protect the public's
health and to deter criminal activity. Although Wbalen
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held that the mandatory disclosure of
prescriptions and patient identities
was not a violation of privacy, the
Court also explained that "[tlhe right
to collect and use such data for
public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures."' 3 The
Court then concluded that "in some
circumstances that duty arguably has
its roots in the Constitution." 
4
Although clearly identified as an
issue "not decided" by the Court,
subsequent cases nevertheless relied
on Whalen's reasoning to develop
what has become a generally
accepted right to privacy in medical
records,
Shortly after Whalen, two district
courts implicitly adopted Justice
Stevens' analysis that the right to
privacy in medical records arguably
has its roots in the Constitution,
although in both cases the right to
privacy did not prohibit disclosure.
In one of the first district court
decisions to rely on Whalen, an
employer, du Pont, raised the right to
privacy argument as a defense to a
subpoena seeking employee health
department to undergo psychological
testing. Even in the absence of public
disclosure of the results, the district
court determined that the "character
and amount of information given to
the Government alone is itself an
intrusion on the privacy interest in
nondisclosure of personal
information to government
employees recognized in Whalen."2
1
As a result, the court required Jersey
City to "justify the burden imposed
on the constitutional right of privacy
by the required psychological
evaluations." 22 After confirming a
right to privacy, the court determined
that there was "sufficient support to
conclude that the psychological
evaluation and hiring procedure
taken as a whole [was] useful and
effective in identifying applicants
whose emotional make-up makes
them high risk candidates for the job
of fire fighting." 23 As in Whalen, the
court balanced the individual's
privacy interests against society's
interest in having a psychologically
sound fire department.
B. The Third Circuit accepts the right
to privacy in medical records.
A federal appellate court soon
There can be no question that
an employee's medical records,
which may contain intimate
facts of a personal nature, are
well within the ambit of
materials entitled to privacy
protection. Information about
one's body and state of health
is a matter which the individual
is ordinarily entitled to retain
within the "private enclave
where he may lead a private
life.'25
As is evident from the quotation,
Weslinghouse was one of the first
cases to accept explicitly Justice
Stevens' "argument" that medical
records may be subject to
constitutional protection. While the
court noted "there can be no
question" of this right, there was also
no previous judicial authority that
could be cited for that proposition.
26
In the absence of judicial decisions
for authority, the Third Circuit relied
on a law review article and
protections for medical records in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Freedom of Information Act.
27
Seven years later, relying on its own
Westinghouse decision, the Third
th.iticutCuto peal concude that,
untorl0uauulo. I lie eipIoyer
argued that the medical records
of its employees were protected
by a constitutional right of
privacy and thus could not be
disclosed.' 6 Relying on Whalen, the
district court inplicitly accepted that
a right to privacy in medical records
existed.' 7 Accordingly, the issue was
"not whether a right of privacy exists
respecting the information sought,
but rather whether the record
indicates that such right will be
abridged."' 8 Although the court
upheld the subpoenas over the right
to privacy claim, the court echoed
Justice Stevens' concern in Whalen
that unwarranted disclosure of the
medical records could violate the
Constitution. 19
Just a year later, in McKenna v.
Fargo,20 a district court considered a
program in which Jersey City
required applicants for its fire





identifying a right to ' '
privacy in medical
records though typically finding in
favor of the invasion of that right. In
one of the first decisions by a circuit
court of appeals upholding a right to
privacy in medical records, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the
Whalen decision to conclude that
there is a protected privacy right "not
to have an individual's private affairs
made public by the government."
24
The Third Circuit concluded that
medical records fall within one of the
zones of privacy entitled to protection:
Circuit again recognized the right to
N privacy in medical records.28 In
1995, the Third Circuit relied on
/the Westinghouse declsion to
conclude that records of
prescription medications are
private.2 9 "An individual using
prescription drigs has a right to
expect that such information will
customarily remain private. "30
C. A division among the circuits on
the right loprivacy in
medical records.
Although the Third Circuit adopted
Justice Stevens' argument, the Sixth
Circuit did not follow suit. Without
citation to Westinghouse or Whalen,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that, "[disclosure of
plaintiff s medical records does not
rise to the level of a breach of a right
recognized as 'fundamental' under
the Constitution."
31
This difference of opinion among
the circuits was brought to the United
States Supreme Court's attention by a
decision of the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,32 the Fourth Circuit
expressly noted the division among
the circuits, as follows:
Although the Supreme Court
addressed a claim to a right of
privacy in medical records in
Whalen, it declined to decide
whether such information
merits constitutional privacy
protection. See Whalen, 429
UI.S. at 605-06. And, the
circuit courts of appeals are
divided on this issue.
33
Although the Uinited States
Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Ferguson, the Court did
not address the division of authority
noted among the circuits, Instead, it
acknowledged an "expectation of
privacy" in medical records, as
follows, "[t]he reasonable expectation
of privacy enjoyed by the typical
patient undergoing diagnostic tests in
a hospital is that the results of those
tests will not be shared with
nonmedical personnel without her
consent. "34 The Court did not
indicate whether this expectation of
privacy was protected by the
Constitution, as had been "argued"
by Stevens in Whalen.
D. No right toprivacy in making
medical decisions.
The Westinghouse line of authority
and the Ferguson decision focus on
the first type of privacy identified in
Whalen, that is avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. 35 The second type
of privacy identified in Whalen is
independence in making certain
important kinds of decisions. 6 it has
not received much, if any, support
from the courts. For example, in New
York State Ophtbalmological Society
v. Bowen,37 the court determined that
there was no right to privacy in
medical deterninations. 38 The
plaintiffs were seeking to challenge a
federal statute limiting Medicare
payments for certain cataract
services. 39 Plaintiffs maintained "that
the right to privacy protects patients'
interest in procuring the treatment of
choice" and insisted that "all medical
treatment decisions are protected
from state interference because they
are inherently private and peculiarly
'personal.'"4° The court concluded
that "[tihere is no basis ulnder current
privacy case law for extending such
stringent protection to every decision
bearing, however indirectly, on a
person's health and physical well-
being."4'
II. Application of a balancing test
to privacy rights in medical
records.
Even in the cases where medical
records were considered within a
zone of privacy, that privacy was
nearly always invaded after
application of a balancing test to
determine whether the "societal
interest in disclosure outweighs the
privacy interest on the specific facts
of the case." 4 According to the Third
Circuit, the factors to be considered
in deciding whether an intrusion into
an individual's privacy is justified are:
[The type of record
requested, the information it
does or might contain, the
potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, the injury from
disclosure to the relationship
in which the record was
generated, the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, the
degree of need for access,
and whether there is an
express statutory mandate,





In lVeaslinghoue, the court balanced
the factors and conclided that
complete employee medical records
needed to be turned over to the
government in response to a
subpoena issued Linder the
Occupational Safety and Health
Act.
44 The court found that "the
interest in occupational safety and
health to the employees in the
particular plant, employees in other
plants, future employees and the
public at large is substantial.45 The
court also relied on the security
measures that would be taken to
protect against the disclosure of the
informration.46 Recognizing that there
may still be privacy concerns, the
Court permitted employees the
opportunity to raise a personal claim
of privacy.
4 7
The Third Circuit has repeatedly
utilized these Westinghouse factors to
conclude that the balance favors
invasion of the privacy right in
medical records. For example, in In
re: Search Warrant, 48 the Third
Circuit concluded the balance
favored disclosure of medical records
where the patients were already
known through insurance
submissions and separate
mechanisms existed to guard against
disclosure and to maintain the
confidentiality of the records. 49 As
well, in Fraternal Order of Police v.
Philadelphia,[0 the Third Circuit
again concluded that the balance





directly related to the interest
of the police department in
selecting officers who are
physically and mentally
capable of working in
dangerous and highly
stressful positions,
sometimes over long periods
of time, and because police
officers have little reasonable
expectations that such
medical information will not
be requested, we hold that
questions 18 [physical
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defects], 19 [prescription
drugs] and 20 [mental or
psychiatric condition] do not
unconstitutionally impinge
upon the applicants' privacy
interests,
52
Finally, in SEPTA, the court
concluded that the right to privacy in
medical records was not absolute.
53
In that case, an employer learned that
one employee suffered from an HIV-
related illness when the employer
reviewed medical records that gave
each employee's name and listed the
prescription drugs each employee
purchased through a prescription
drug program. 54 In its review, the
court concluded that audits of drug
information, in the aggregate, are
essential to the public interest 55 The
review of the identity of the
employee and his medication was
not a violation of the employee's
privacy largely because it was
unintentional. 56 The employer did
not ask for the employee's identity
from the drug company.57
In concluding that the balance
favors disclosure, other courts have
relied on the purpose of the
disclosure in order to override the
privacy rights. For example, in 1985,
the District Court for New Jersey
concluded that the privacy interests
in medical records were not absolute
and needed to be balanced against
the legitimate interests of the state in
securing such information.
58 In
Shoemaker, jockeys were required to
disclose illnesses or conditions for
which a particular drug had been
prescribed or used. 59 However
access to the information was
limited.60 In concluding that the
balance favored the interests of the
state, the court focused on the
purpose, noting that "[s]uch
information is gathered with
'rehabilitative' and not 'penal'
purposes in mind.' 61 Another
example is Patients of Dr. Barbara
Solomon v. Board of Physician
Quality Assurance.62 There, the court
acknowledged a privacy interest in
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medical records but found in favor of
the government's interest in
reviewing that information. 63 In that
case, patients were attempting to
keep a regulatory body from
reviewing the medical records
maintained by their doctor.64 The
court focused on the purpose of the
information and the safeguards, as
follows:
Given the Board's mission of
identifying physicians who
engage in immoral or
unprofessional conduct, and
the Board's goal of
preventing future
misconduct, courts in this
Circuit would most likely
find that the Board's activity





records are adequate to
protect the Patients from
widespread disclosure,
courts in this Circuit would
most likely find no
constitutional violation 65
In In Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum,
66
the court considered challenges to
four subpoenas issued arising from
an investigation into federal health
care offenses.67 The doctor argued
that his patients' privacy interests in
their medical files outweigh the
government's interest in those files.
68
The court rejected the argument
because the government has a
compelling interest in identifying
illegal activity and in deterring future
misconduct.69 That interest
outweighs the privacy rights of those
whose records were turned over to
the government, particularly in light
of the protections associated with the
subpoena. 71 The subpoena
prohibited use of disclosed
information except as directly related
to receipt of health care, payment for
health care, a fraudulent claim
related to health care or as
authorized by a court.
7i
III. The right to privacy in
medical records in Colorado.
Various states, including Colorado,
have adopted an approach to privacy
based on the federal courts'
approach. More than twenty years
ago, in a case not specifically related
to medical records, the Colorado
Supreme Court adopted the Whalen
privacy analysis, and performed a
balancing test to invalidate a state
agency's regulation. 72 Several life
insurance agents brought suit to
enjoin the Colorado Division of
Insurance's enforcement of a
regulation requiring them to notify a
life insurer whose insurance was
being replaced of the proposed
replacement, even when the insured
specifically requested that the
transaction remain confidential.
73
Acknowledging that the United
States Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right to privacy, the
Colorado court, citing several United
States Supreme Court cases, found
that the right to privacy is implicit in
various Constitutional amendments,
including the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Bill of Rights.74 The Colorado
court adopted the Whalen definition
of two types of privacy interests: "1)
the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters; and 2)
the individual interest in making
certain kinds of important
decisions."75 The court found that the
insurance regulation clearly invaded
the insured's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.76 The
Colorado court enjoined
enforcement of the regulation but
noted that "a burdensome regulation
may be validated by a sufficiently
compelling state interest."77 "A
generalized concern for protecting
the public from unscrupulous
practices or misrepresentations by
replacing insurers is outweighed by
the insured's request for
nondisclosure. 78
Seven years later, without
discussion of the constitutional
aspects of the right, the Colorado
Supreme Court implicitly recognized
a right to privacy regarding medical
information. 7 9 Respondents were
recipients of donated blood infected
with the AIDS virus.80 They sought
disclosure of the identities of each of
the donors whose blood was used
and production of all of the donors'
records in order to pursue their
claims. 81 The blood center asserted
that compelling public policy
grounds, including the maintenance
of the supply of volunteer blood and
the privacy interests of volunteer
blood donors, prohibited disclosure
of the donors' identities.
82
The court performed a balancing
test and determined that the blood
donors had a "privacy interest in
remaining anonymous and avoiding
the embarrassment and potential
humiliation of being identified as
AIDS carriers. " 83 The blood center,
and society as a whole, had "an
interest in maintaining the availability
of an abundant supply of volunteer
blood. "84 The petitioners had an
interest in pursuing their claims.
8 5
Therefore, the court tailored a limited
discovery procedure designed to
provide the respondents with tie
information without risking the
consequences of public disclosure of
the donors' identities or infringing
upon society's interests in a safe,
adequate, voluntary blood supply.
86
While no constitutional authority was
cited, the Belle Bonfils case indicated
that Colorado courts would
recognize a right to privacy
concerning medical information, but
that this right must be balanced by
the societal interest in disclosing the
information.
Although the Colorado courts have
not explicitly applied the Wbalen
analysis to medical information,
when considering privacy interests,
the courts recognize a right to
privacy regarding medical
information, and balance the
individual's privacy interests with
society's interest in obtaining the
information. 87 As with the federal
cases, the emphasis in Colorado has
been on the first interest expressed in
Whalen, that of avoiding disclosure
of personal matters, as opposed to
the second interest of independence
in making certain kinds of decisions.
IV. Privacy rights in medical
records give rise to a tort
claim for invasion of privacy.
The Whalen and Westinghouse
decisions address medical records'
right of privacy in the context of
government actions. However, courts
have also recognized that the private
sector may be liable for claims for
violating privacy with respect to
medical records. 88 Even in cases
where there was no liability, a court
would not rule out the possibility that
instances may exist where the
collection of highly personal
information irrelevant to any
legitimate business purpose might
constitute an invasion of privacy by
unreasonable intrusion.8 9
The state law claim of invasion of
privacy generally requires the
plaintiff to establish: "1) an intrusion
upon her seclusion or solitude or in
her private affairs; 2) a public
disclosure of embarrassing private
facts; 3) publicity which places her in
a false light in the public eye; or 4) an
appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness."90 While medical records
often trigger privacy interests, the
communications may be considered
privileged where the following
elements are satisfied: "1) good faith;
2) an interest to be upheld; 3) a
statement limited in its scope to this
purpose; 4) a proper occasion; and 5)
publication in a proper manner and
to proper parties only."9 1
In Ross, an employee had
complaints about working under
fluorescent lights. 92 The employer
required her to see the agency's
doctor, a psychologist. 93 The
employee authorized the doctor to
forward a copy of the psychological
evaluation to one individual, who
then distributed the report to three
others at the office. 94 Because there
was a reasonable belief that the other
individuals needed to review the
report, the court ruled that the
employer was not liable, even
though the situation could "have
been handled in a more sensitive
way."
95
Other cases have resulted in the
employer's liability for invasion of
privacy. For example, in Levias, the
medical examiner for an employer
(United Airlines) received a report
from a flight attendant containing
details of contemplated
gynecological surgery.9 6 The medical
examiner disclosed most of that
information to the flight attendant's
male flight supervisor, who had no
compelling reason to know it, and to
the employee's husband.9 7 The flight
supervisor repeatedly contacted her
to discuss the details of her medical
condition and its effect on her
employment. 98 The flight attendant
had not authorized the medical
examiner to disclose any of that
information, and she considered it
highly personal. 99 The court upheld a
damages claim (for compensatory
damages but not punitive damages)
for the flight attendant, concluding
that it was "doubtful that either the
flight attendant's supervisors or her
husband had a real need to know the
disclosed data." 10
As another example, in Colorado,
in a case of first impression, the
Colorado Supreme Court recognized
a tort claim for invasion of privacy "in
the nature of unreasonable publicity
given to one's private life," in the
context of medical information.IrI
The court determined that disclosure
of "disgraceful illnesses" are
considered private in nature and
disclosure of such facts constitutes an
invasion of the individual's right of
privacy.
102
Though admittedly based on a
different test, the court's recognition
of a tort claim for invasion of privacy
based on medical records generally
appears to track the approach set
forth in Whalen and Westinghouse.
continued onpage 553
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The courts recognize a privacy
interest in medical records and then
balance that interest against various
legitimate purposes associated with
disclosing that information.
V. The HIPAA regulations
adopt and seek to implement
the privacy interests and
balancing tests developed in
the various cases.
In 1996, Congress enacted the
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). 13
Among other things, HIPAA required
Congress to enact new safeguards to
protect the security and
confidentiality of health care
information. Congress failed to do so,
requiring the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") to
promulgate regulations for such
protections10 4 In November of 1999,
HHS published proposed regulations
and, during the comment period,
received 52,000 communications
from the public1 0 5 In December
2000, HHS issued the final rule that
took effect on April 14, 2001,106
However, most covered entities have
until April 14, 2003 to comply with
the final rule's provisions.10 7 The
HIPAA regulations are intended to
establish a set of basic national
privacy standards to serve as a floor
of ground rules for health care
providers, health plans and health
care clearinghouses to follow.
108
In promulgating the regulations,
HHS considered the need for privacy
of medical records to be great. 10' The
HHS recognized a "growing concern"
stemming from several trends,
"including the growing use of
interconnected electronic media for
business and personal activities, our
increasing ability to know an
individual's genetic make-up, and, in
health care, the increasing
complexity of the system."" 0) Unless
those public concerns were allayed,
the HHS believed we would be
"unable to obtain the full benefits of
electronic technologies. The absence
of national standards for the
confidentiality of health information
has made the health care industry
and the population in general
uncomfortable about this primarily
financially-driven expansion in the
use of electronic data.""' The HHS
focused on one of the same concerns
that was recognized by various
courts, the consequences of sharing
information without the knowledge
of the patient involved."
12
In concluding that "privacy is a
fundamental right," HHS looked to
judicial authority and, in particular, to
the Whalen decision. 113 In several
aspects, the HIPAA regulations have
followed the guidance from the
federal courts. 114 In relying on this
federal authority, HHS did not
specifically address the fact that the
judicial authority it cited related to
the right to privacy from the
perspective of government actors
rather than the private sector, which
is not subject to the constitutional
restrictions. 1
15
There are several principles from
the federal decisions that are
reflected and expanded in the HIPAA
regulations. First, the cases generally
accept that there is an expectation of
privacy in medical records, although
the extent to which it reaches a
constitutionally protected right may
be debated.116 In promulgating the
regulations, HHS characterized
privacy as a "fundamental right" and
concluded that the "United States
Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutional protection of personal
health information" in Wbalen.
117
Second, the HIPAA regulations focus
on the first type of individual privacy
protection identified in Whalen, the
protection for medical records. 18
The HIPAA regulations do not seek to
protect medical decision-making, an
interest also largely ignored by the
courts.119 Third, the HIPAA
regulations acknowledge that the
right to privacy "is not absolute" and
must be balanced against legitimate
continued onpage 556
continued from page 518
California v. Ciraolo24, the Court held
that an overflight of the defendant's
property by a police airplane did not
amount to a search, on the unusual
ground that the plane was in FAA
approved air space. The Court's
rationale for this rule was that no
expectation of privacy could be
reasonable, as "[alny member of the
public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers
observed."25 Here, the individual's
fault is not conveying information
to a third party, but failing to properly
safeguard his property:
That the area is within the
curtilage does not itself bar
all police observation. The
Fourth Amendment
protection of the home has
never been extended to
require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a hone on
public thoroughfares. Nor
does the mere fact that an
individual has taken
measures to restrict some
views of his activities
preclude an officer's
observations from a public
vantage point where he has a
right to be and which renders
the activities clearly visible.2
6
In its most recent Fourth
Amendment case, Kyllo v. United
States,27 the Court held that the use of
thermal imaging technology to
measure the heat coming off of a
dwelling was a search subject to the
requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court held that
because the device provided details
about the interior of a home that
could not otherwise be obtained
without trespassing into the home
and because the device had not yet
entered into general use, its use
constituted a search. 28 The flip-side of
this argument appears to be that had
the device used by the police
continued onpage 574
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public uses of that information.'
2 °
However, steps must be taken to
ensure that the balancing does not
result in unnecessary privacy
breaches. 121
Initially, the HIPAA regulations
seek to implement these principles
with its definitions. The regulations
protect the defined term "protected
health information" by generally
limiting the use of that information to
the individual or with the individual's
consent."a That key phrase -
protected health information -is
based on another defined phrase,
"individually identifiable health
information. ",123 In turn, "individually
identifiable health information" is
defined as a subset of health
information, including demographic
information collected from an
individual that:
(1) Is created or received by
a health care provider, health
plan, employer or health
care clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past,
present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of
an individual; the provision
of health care to an
individual; or the past,
present or future payment
for the provision of health
care to an individual; and
(i) That identifies the
individual;
(ii) With respect to




used to identify the
individual.
124
However, health information that
does not identify an individual or
permit identification of the individual
does not meet the definition of
"identifiable health information."1 25
In order to satisfy this exclusion,
numerous identifiers must be
removed, including identifiers such
as names, dates, numbers, addresses
and any unique identifying
E
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characteristics 126
Similar to the balancing test from
judicial decisions, the regulations
identify many situations where the
"protected health information" may
be disclosed, even without consent,
so long as it Is required by law and
the use or disclosure complies with
and is limited to the relevant
requirements of law. 127 Similar to the
federal case law, appropriate
disclosures are determined based on





To a public health authority
to prevent or control
disease or injury;
To a public health authority
authorized by law to
receive reports of child
abuse or neglect;
To a person who may have
been exposed to a
communicable disease or
may otherwise be at risk of
contracting or spreading a
disease or condition;
To a social service agency
about a victim of abuse,
neglect or domestic
violence, if required by law
and if the individual
consents or if there is a
belief that disclosure is
necessary to prevent
serious harm to individuals;




To a law enforcement
official's request for the
purpose of identifying or
locating a suspect, fugitive,
material witness or missing
person.
30
This list focuses on many of the
purposes identified in the federal
case law as appropriate and
necessary societal uses of medical
records. As noted by justice Stevens
in Whalen, disclosures for these
types of purposes are those
"unpleasant invasions of privacy that
are associated with many facets of
health care. "'31 The HIPAA
regulations seek to implement the
courts' case-by-case analysis by
itemizing those instances where
society's needs outweigh the
individual's privacy rights. While the
regulatory approach provides more
specificity, it also lacks the flexibility
that would be exercised by a court
enforcing the existing case-by-case
approach. However, that specificity
may provide greater certainty and
predictability, which are critical for
the entities subject to HIPAA.
Conclusion
The right to privacy in medical
records is balanced against society's
expected invasions of privacy related
to health care. Our expectation of
privacy in those records has never
been seriously contested. Federal
courts have consistently reached that
conclusion without the need for
precedent. However, those rights
often fail in the balancing test against
society's interests. The extent to
which the privacy expectation rises
to a constitutional right has not yet
been resolved and may never be
resolved, The HTPAA regulations
attempt to adopt the balance
established by the courts, by
protecting medical records and
protecting society's legitimate uses of
the health care information.
